Agricultural Economics and Development

Agricultural Economics and Development

Application of Non-symmetric Nash Solution to Determine the Optimal Extraction of Groundwater Aquifers in Jiroft Plain of Iran

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
E. Mohammadi Soliemani 1
M. Ahmadian 2
A. Keramatzadeh 3
M. Shokat Fadaei 4
A. Mahmoodi 5
1 PhD Student in Agricultural Economics, Payame Noor University of Tehran, Iran
2 Professor, Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Tehran, Iran.
3 Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Gorgan University of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources
4 Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Payame Noor University of Tehran, Iran.
5 Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Payame Noor University of Tehran, Iran
10.30490/aead.2020.252687.0
Abstract
Abstract
Planning for production, preventing harmful discharge of the aquifers and equilibrium of groundwater resources requires a balancing the water resources and optimizing the crop activities. Excessive extraction from the groundwater table of Jiroft Plain in Iran has led to a decline in the level of the aquifer; and if the current trend continues, the economies of the region based on agriculture will face a serious threat. This study aimed at determining the optimal extraction of groundwater resources in this plain, taking into account the combination of economic and environmental goals, using game theory. Consequently, two conflicting objectives of maximizing farmers' profit and reducing the environmental hazards corresponding to 14 extraction scenarios of groundwater resources were calculated in a positive mathematical programming (PMP) model using the GAMS software. Then, using the game theory (asymmetric Nash solution), the optimum extraction of groundwater resources of the plain and the proportional cropping pattern were determined. Based on the results, the greater the importance of environmental objectives, the lower the amount of water extraction; and the average of optimal water extraction from groundwater resources in the crop year 2015-2016 would be equal to773 million cubic meters, while considering the same weight for economic and environmental purposes. Also, within the cropping pattern proportional to the optimal water extraction, there would be reductions in the amount of water extraction by 9.8, the existing crop area by 14.9 and the net income of farmers by 5.9 percent per year. Therefore, the study suggested the compliance with considerations of environmental goals and long-term benefits of the community to modify the existing cropping pattern as well as the reduction in water extraction volume from groundwater resources in the plain.
Keywords
Groundwater
Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP)
Game Theory
Jiroft (Plain
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