Study of Moral Hazard Phenomenon of Barley Insurance Plan in Khorasan Razavi

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Abstract

Abstract
In this paper an attempt has been made to survey the phenomenon of moral hazard using information of 300 questionnaires that completing from barley farmers in Khorasan Razavi province in 2009-2010. For this purpose, discriminate analysis was used. Standardized coefficients of discriminate analysis show that increasing the use of seed led to reduce the willingness of farmers to insurance, and increasing the capital, machinery, fertilizer and water led to increase the willingness of farmers to be insured. Results of no standardized coefficients of discriminate analysis indicate that with increase one unit in capital, machinery, fertilizer and water; discernment degree is increasing about 0.05, 0.8, 0.25 and 0.2 respectively. Therefore, insured group in the use of agricultural inputs has not any moral hazard. Accordingly, it is suggested that to accomplish the policies such as applying discount rate premiums for farmers that do not received any bote.

JEL Classification: R11, O13

Kewwords:
Moral Hazard, Insurance, Discriminate Analysis, Barley, Khorasan Razavi

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